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Abstract 
 
In recent years, several authors have debated about the justifiability of so-
called scientific imperialism. To date, however, widespread disagreements 
remain regarding both the identification and the normative evaluation of 
scientific imperialism. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation by making 
some conceptual distinctions concerning scientific imperialism and by 
providing a detailed assessment of the most prominent objections to it. I shall 
argue that these objections provide a valuable basis for opposing some 
instances of scientific imperialism, but do not yield cogent reasons to think 
that scientific imperialism in general is objectionable or unjustified. I then 
highlight three wide-ranging implications of this result for the ongoing 
philosophical debate about the justifiability of scientific imperialism. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Over the last few decades, there have been intense philosophical 
discussions of so-called scientific imperialism (henceforth, SI). The 
involved authors provided increasingly sophisticated conceptualizations of 
this notion (see e.g. Cartwright, 1999, Clarke and Walsh, 2009 and 2013, 
and Dupré, 1995) and debated at length about the justifiability of specific 
instances of SI (see e.g. Downes, 2017, Lazear, 2000, and Mäki, 2009 and 
2013). There are at least three reasons why SI deserves detailed 
philosophical scrutiny. First, SI contributions target a vast range of natural 
and social disciplines, and have significant epistemic and pragmatic 
influences on modelling and theorizing in these disciplines (see e.g. 
Hirshleifer, 1985, and Fine, 2000, on economists’ SI contributions to other 
decision sciences; see also Churchland, 2007, and Piccinini and Craver, 
2011, on neuroscientists’ SI contributions to other cognitive sciences). 
Second, discussions of SI bear on a series of foundational issues in 
epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g. unity of science and 
methodological pluralism, proper relations between different disciplines, 
epistemic authority of science). And third, SI contributions raise several 
concerns of pressing social and political relevance (see e.g. Dupré, 2001, 
ch.3-4, on some controversial implications of evolutionary psychologists’ 
SI contributions for the politics of sex and gender, and Vincent, 2013, on 
how neuroscientists’ SI contributions affect entrenched conceptions of 
moral and legal responsibility). 
 
To date, however, widespread disagreements remain regarding both the 
identification and the normative evaluation of SI (see e.g. Davis, 2017, on 
economists’ SI contributions, and Fumagalli, 2017a, on neuroscientists’ SI 
contributions). In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation by making some 
conceptual distinctions concerning SI and by providing a detailed 
assessment of the most prominent objections to SI. The paper is organized 
as follows. In Section 2, I explicate the notion of SI and distinguish it from 
various forms of non-imperialistic disciplinary interaction. In Sections 3-6, 
I draw on a wide range of illustrations from natural and social disciplines 
to reconstruct and appraise four influential objections to SI. I consider in 
turn: the objection from disciplinary autonomy (see e.g. Aizawa and Gillett, 
2011, and Fodor, 1974); the objection from the disunity of science (see e.g. 
Dupré, 1983, 1995 and 2001); the objection from counterfactual scientific 
progress (see e.g. Clarke and Walsh, 2009 and 2013); and the objection 
from cumulative constraints (see e.g. Mäki, 2009 and 2013).1 I shall argue 
that these objections provide a valuable basis for opposing some instances 
of SI, but do not yield cogent reasons to think that SI in general is 
objectionable or unjustified. If correct, this result supports at least three 
                                                          
1 This list encompasses the most cited and influential objections to SI. Not all of 
these objections have been proposed to ground principled opposition to SI. Still, 
all those objections have been put forward to identify what features allegedly make 
SI unjustified and to articulate why one should resist SI contributions (see e.g. 
Clarke and Walsh, 2009, Dupré, 1995, and Mäki, 2013). 
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wide-ranging implications for the ongoing philosophical debate about the 
justifiability of SI. 
 
First, the critics of SI should provide more informative criteria for assessing 
SI and ground their opposition to SI on more plausible empirical and 
normative presuppositions. Second, what (if anything) makes some SI 
contributions objectionable does not lie in their imperialistic character, but 
rather relates to putative flaws in their empirical or normative 
presuppositions and to the unwarranted social or pragmatic implications 
some derive from such contributions. And third, the justifiability of SI 
contributions is best judged on the basis of specific case studies (see e.g. 
Fumagalli, 2017a, for a critical appraisal of neuroscientists’ SI 
contributions targeting entrenched philosophical conceptions of free 
agency) rather than general evaluative criteria that abstract away from the 
modelling and explanatory practices of the examined disciplines. These 
three implications do not exclude that one may gain informative insights by 
assessing specific subsets of SI contributions qua imperialistic 
contributions (e.g. some SI contributions may share evidential and 
methodological features that make it helpful to group them for specific 
evaluative purposes). Still, they should make scientific theorists and 
practitioners wary of general calls either in favour of or against SI 
contributions. In particular, they challenge all those who debate about SI to 
further refine the criteria proposed for evaluating the justifiability of SI and 
focus their evaluations on specific subsets of SI contributions. 
 
 
2.  Defining Scientific Imperialism 
 
 
The notion of SI has been given several characterizations by philosophers. 
Most of these characterizations relate SI to the systematic application of a 
discipline’s theories and methods to model and explain phenomena 
investigated by other disciplines. For instance, some define SI in terms of 
specific disciplines’ (e.g. physics and economics) aim to “account for 
almost everything” in the natural and the social world (Cartwright, 1999, 1; 
see also Fine, 2000, and Lazear, 2000, for similar characterizations). 
Similarly, others define SI as “the tendency to push a good scientific idea 
far beyond the domain in which it was originally introduced” for modelling 
and explanatory purposes (Dupré, 2001, 74; see also Stigler, 1984, and 
Dupré, 1995, for similar characterizations). The specialized literature has 
recently witnessed the proliferation of fine-grained distinctions regarding 
both the notion of SI and putatively different types of imperialistic 
contributions (see e.g. Mäki, 2009, for a distinction between imperialism of 
standing, imperialism of style, and imperialism of scope; see also Peels, 
2016, and Stenmark, 2001, ch.1, on various forms of scientism). Below I 
gloss over these distinctions unless the cogency of my evaluation rests on 
such distinctions. For present purposes, the following remarks about the 
notion of SI are worth making. 
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2.1 SI and Disciplinary Boundaries. Discussions of SI commonly 
presuppose that scientific theorists and practitioners can reliably demarcate 
disciplinary boundaries (see e.g. Lazear, 2000). Nonetheless, speaking of 
SI does not commit one to associate sharp and immutable boundaries to 
disciplines (see e.g. Dupré, 1983, and Kidd, 2013). In fact, various authors 
in the SI literature emphasize that disciplinary boundaries are often blurry 
and can vary remarkably depending on several factors, ranging from 
researchers’ epistemic interests to specific technological developments (see 
e.g. Roskies, 2010, on how progress in brain-imaging technology expanded 
the set of phenomena amenable to neuroscientific investigation). This 
variability can make it difficult to demarcate the domain of specific 
disciplines (see e.g. Brigandt, 2010, on biology) and establish whether 
particular cross-disciplinary interactions qualify as instances of SI (see e.g. 
Mäki and Marchionni, 2010). However, as I illustrate in point 2.2, it does 
not preclude one from identifying clear paradigmatic cases of SI (see also 
Sections 3-6 for other illustrations).2 
 
2.2 Imperialistic versus non-Imperialistic Contributions. In the literature 
on SI, various criteria have been put forward to demarcate the set of SI 
contributions. In this paper, I speak of SI contributions broadly to cover 
systematic cross-disciplinary applications of theories and methods that 
directly intrude in the modelling and explanatory practices of the targeted 
disciplines (see e.g. Mäki, 2013, on so-called disciplinary imperialism). In 
doing so, I use the expression ‘modelling and explanatory practices’ to 
include both theoretical (e.g. classificatory) and pragmatic (e.g. problem 
solving) activities, with the terms ‘models’ and ‘explanations’ covering 
different types of models (e.g. causal and mathematical models) and 
distinct accounts of explanation (e.g. unificationist and mechanistic 
accounts). This characterization of SI contributions is sufficiently broad to 
encompass most alleged instances of SI (see e.g. Sections 3-6) and 
sufficiently precise to distinguish SI contributions from various forms of 
non-imperialistic disciplinary interaction (e.g. think of cases where a 
discipline’s methods are applied to model previously unexplored 
phenomena and of cases where different disciplines exchange specific 
findings while continuing to pursue specialized research agenda). In 
particular, such characterization excludes from the set of SI contributions 
cross-disciplinary applications of theories and methods that do not directly 
intrude in the modelling and explanatory practices of the targeted 
disciplines (see e.g. Mäki, 2013, on so-called domain-only imperialism).3 
                                                          
2 I focus on disciplinary boundaries as opposed to boundaries between units of 
analysis other than disciplines (see e.g. Darden and Maull, 1977, on fields, and 
Lakatos, 1970, on research programs) because in this paper I prevalently discuss 
interactions between different disciplines. My remarks concerning prominent 
objections to SI may be reformulated so as to target interactions between units of 
analysis other than disciplines. 
3 The set of systematic cross-disciplinary applications of theories and methods that 
directly intrude in the modelling and explanatory practices of the targeted 
disciplines may be regarded as more or less broad depending on how one interprets 
the terms ‘systematic’ and ‘applications’. However, this interpretative concern 
does not make my characterization of SI overly broad or uninformative. For on 
5 
 
 
2.3 Descriptive versus Normative Definitions of SI. Two types of 
definitions of SI are frequently contrasted in the SI literature. On the one 
hand, some employ ‘SI’ to designate an inherently objectionable (see e.g. 
Dupré, 1995) or commendable (see e.g. Hirshleifer, 1985) form of cross-
disciplinary interaction (normative definitions). On the other hand, others 
(see e.g. Mäki, 2009, and Mäki and Marchionni, 2010) use ‘SI’ as a 
normatively neutral term, and distinguish justified and unjustified SI 
contributions depending on how these contributions fare in terms of further 
evaluative criteria (descriptive definitions). If correct, my thesis that the 
justifiability of SI contributions is best judged on the basis of specific case 
studies challenges the proponents of normative definitions of SI to provide 
reasons other than mere stipulation to adopt normative - as opposed to 
descriptive - definitions of SI. To be sure, one could always advocate the 
adoption of normative definitions of SI by stipulating at the outset that SI 
constitutes an inherently objectionable (or commendable) form of cross-
disciplinary interaction. However, this stipulation threatens to trivialize the 
debate about the justifiability of SI by presupposing (rather than showing) 
that there are no justified instances of SI (or that all instances of SI are 
justified). Moreover, the reasons proposed to adopt normative (as opposed 
to descriptive) definitions of SI fall short of demonstrating that normative 
definitions are generally superior or otherwise preferable to descriptive 
ones. Let me expand on this point. 
 
In recent years, various authors have advocated the adoption of normative 
definitions over descriptive ones on the alleged ground that the term 
‘imperialism’ was originally imported from political contexts, where such 
term has inherent negative connotations (see e.g. Dupré, 2001). The idea is 
that just as political imperialists aim to dominate other political 
communities (e.g. population groups) scientific imperialists aim to 
dominate other scientific disciplines (see e.g. Clarke and Walsh, 2009). 
These calls to adopt normative (as opposed to descriptive) definitions of SI 
invite two interrelated rejoinders. First, the term ‘imperialism’ does not 
invariably have inherent negative connotations in political contexts (see e.g. 
Walsh and Boucher, 2017, on normatively neutral uses of such term). And 
second, even assuming that the term ‘imperialism’ invariably has inherent 
negative connotations in political contexts, the hypothesized fact that this 
term invariably has inherent negative connotations in such contexts falls 
short of implying that ‘SI’ should be used in a normative (as opposed to 
descriptive) sense. In particular, vindicating the adoption of normative 
definitions of SI would require the proponents of such definitions to show 
that cross-disciplinary relations are analogous to relations between political 
communities. However, the proponents of normative definitions of SI have 
hitherto failed to substantiate this analogy (see e.g. Mäki, 2016), and such 
analogy seems to break down in several respects (see e.g. Olson and 
                                                          
most interpretations of ‘systematic’ and ‘applications’, a few occasional or 
isolated instances of cross-disciplinary interaction fall short of constituting 
instances of SI. 
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Kähkönen, 2000, for a critical comparison of relations between political 
communities and relations between academic disciplines). 
 
2.4 Evaluating SI. Several criteria have been proposed to assess the 
justifiability of SI contributions (see e.g. Fallis, 2006, on trade-offs between 
epistemic costs and benefits, and Clarke and Walsh, 2013, on the 
availability of non-imperialistic forms of cross-disciplinary interaction). 
What relevance one ascribes to distinct criteria may vary remarkably 
depending on several factors, ranging from the epistemic interests of the 
involved disciplines’ practitioners (see e.g. McMullin, 1983) to the 
modelling standards and methods entrenched in such disciplines (see e.g. 
Longino, 2002, ch.8). Both epistemic and non-epistemic values inform the 
criteria proposed to assess the justifiability of SI contributions (see e.g. 
Ylikoski and Kuorikoski, 2010, on epistemic values such as explanatory 
power, Parker, 2013, on pragmatic values such as predictive robustness, 
and Rolin, 2017, on values that combine epistemic and non-epistemic 
dimensions such as epistemic justice). In fact, the debate concerning the 
justifiability of SI contributions frequently targets not just the issue whether 
these contributions promote (rather than hinder) specific values, but also 
the issue how these values are most aptly conceptualized (see e.g. Ylikoski, 
2013, on distinct conceptualizations of explanatory power). These 
evaluative issues are conceptually distinct, but many interrelations can be 
found between them (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Marchionni, 2014, on how 
discipline-specific conceptions of epistemic values affect model 
construction and model evaluation in economics and sociology). I expand 
in Sections 3-6 on these interrelations and their implications for the 
evaluation of the justifiability of SI contributions.4 
 
 
3.  Objection from Disciplinary Autonomy 
 
 
The objection from disciplinary autonomy opposes SI contributions on the 
alleged ground that these contributions reduce or threaten the autonomy of 
the targeted disciplines from the imperializing disciplines (see e.g. Aizawa 
and Gillett, 2011, and Fodor, 1974). The critics of SI have provided 
different characterizations of disciplinary autonomy, which refer to criteria 
such as the availability of specialized methods and modelling frameworks, 
the existence of independent research groups and journals, and the 
irreducibility of a discipline’s theoretical principles or empirical 
generalizations to the principles or generalizations of other disciplines (see 
e.g. Fine, 2000, Mäki, 2016, and Mayr, 2004, ch.2). Suppose, for the sake 
of argument, that the critics of SI provide a precise and uncontroversial 
                                                          
4 In recent years, some authors attempted to provide more fine-grained partitions 
of the set of epistemic and non-epistemic values (see e.g. Douglas, 2013). I 
mention these attempts in passing since the cogency of my evaluation does not 
rest on what position one takes concerning such attempts. For a critical discussion 
of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, see e.g. Longino, 
1996. For a proposal to regard such distinction as a continuum in some scientific 
contexts, see e.g. Rooney, 1992. 
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characterization of disciplinary autonomy. Assume further that these 
authors succeed in showing that disciplinary autonomy is an intrinsically 
valuable desideratum that is worth promoting and defending across 
disciplinary boundaries (see e.g. Chang, 2015, and Kusch, 2015, for a 
recent debate). Even so, the proposed attempts to ground opposition to SI 
on considerations of disciplinary autonomy face at least three unaddressed 
justificatory challenges. 
 
First, the alleged fact that disciplinary autonomy is intrinsically valuable 
does not imply that it is also unconditionally valuable, i.e. that it is valuable 
irrespective of the influence that considerations of disciplinary autonomy 
do or may have on the involved disciplines’ modelling and explanatory 
practices. Indeed, one can think of several cases where disciplinary 
autonomy does not seem unconditionally valuable in this sense. To give 
one example, considerations of disciplinary autonomy frequently hamper 
the development of epistemically productive forms of cross-disciplinary 
collaboration, preventing scientific theorists and practitioners from 
achieving epistemic and pragmatic goals they would be able to achieve 
through cross-disciplinary exchanges and integrations (see e.g. Ylikoski, 
2014, for various examples of research projects that require cross-
disciplinary expertise in the social sciences, and Wray, 2002, for analogous 
illustrations from the natural sciences). 
 
Second, SI contributions often yield major modelling and explanatory 
benefits to the imperializing and/or the targeted disciplines. These benefits, 
in turn, may compensate for the loss of disciplinary autonomy involved in 
SI contributions even under the assumption that disciplinary autonomy has 
high intrinsic value. To illustrate this, consider the systematic import of 
analytical techniques from mathematics and physics into population 
ecology (see e.g. Vandermeer and Goldberg, 2003, on equilibrium-based 
analyses and non-equilibrium dynamics). The import of these analytical 
techniques reduced the autonomy of population ecology from mathematics 
and physics, making several results subsequently obtained by population 
ecologists conditional on the reliability and the accuracy of the imported 
techniques. Yet, population ecologists have significantly increased their 
models’ explanatory power by importing these analytical techniques, and 
few population ecologists would relinquish this increase in explanatory 
power for the sole sake of preserving disciplinary autonomy (see e.g. Clarke 
and Walsh, 2009).5 
 
And third, on most of the criteria for assessing disciplinary autonomy, not 
all SI contributions reduce or threaten the autonomy of the disciplines they 
target. In fact, several SI contributions enhance (rather than reduce) the 
                                                          
5 Whether the modelling and explanatory benefits yielded by SI contributions are 
plausibly taken to justify these contributions may depend on a number of 
evaluative issues (e.g. how such benefits are distributed across the imperializing 
and the targeted disciplines; see also point 2.4 above). As a result, many judgments 
about the justifiability of SI contributions are contestable. This, however, implies 
neither that all judgments about the justifiability of SI contributions are equally 
plausible nor that disagreements about such judgments are irresolvable. 
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autonomy of the targeted disciplines. By way of illustration, consider the 
wide range of evolutionary branches generated by evolutionary SI 
contributions across distinct social and behavioral sciences (see e.g. 
Alexander, 2007, and Downes, 2017, on evolutionary biology, evolutionary 
linguistics and evolutionary game theory). These evolutionary branches 
count as autonomous from the imperializing disciplines in terms of several 
criteria for disciplinary autonomy (see e.g. Alexander, 2007, on the 
irreducibility of the notions of cultural evolution targeted by evolutionary 
game theorists to mere biological evolution; see also Downes, 2017, on the 
independent journals and departments dedicated to evolutionary 
approaches in various behavioral sciences). The emergence of these 
autonomous evolutionary branches does not license the claim that SI 
contributions generally enhance (rather than reduce) the autonomy of the 
targeted disciplines. However, it indicates that considerations of 
disciplinary autonomy can ground opposition to a relatively narrow subset 
of SI contributions, and may often be taken to bear in favour of SI 
contributions. 
 
Faced with these observations, a critic of SI may acknowledge that 
considerations of disciplinary autonomy do not ground wide-ranging 
opposition to SI. Still, she may object that SI contributions should be 
resisted on the alleged ground that they unjustifiably reduce cross-
disciplinary diversity, i.e. the heterogeneity of the modelling practices and 
the theoretical perspectives entrenched across the involved disciplines (see 
e.g. Dupré, 1995). The idea is that SI contributions prompt unjustified 
restrictions in disciplines’ modelling practices and tend to impose a “unique 
and homogeneous [theoretical] perspective” on the study of heterogeneous 
phenomena (Dupré, 2001, 131; see also Rosenberg, 1979, for analogous 
remarks against Becker’s, 1976, rational choice models of family relations 
and racial discrimination). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that cross-
disciplinary diversity is an intrinsically valuable desideratum that is worth 
promoting and defending across disciplinary boundaries. Even so, the three 
justificatory challenges facing the objection from disciplinary autonomy 
also plague the proffered appeals to cross-disciplinary diversity. 
 
First, the alleged fact that cross-disciplinary diversity is intrinsically 
valuable does not imply that it is also unconditionally valuable, and one can 
think of several cases where cross-disciplinary diversity does not seem 
unconditionally valuable. To give one example, profound differences can 
be identified between the modelling practices that are respectively 
entrenched in economics, psychology and neuroscience (see e.g. Fumagalli, 
2016a, on the modelling constructs used in these disciplines and the 
explanatory aims pursued by the practitioners of those disciplines). These 
differences, in turn, have severely hindered the development of explanatory 
neuroeconomic models of choice (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010). 
This does not cast doubt on the alleged intrinsic value of cross-disciplinary 
diversity, but nicely illustrates that relying on heterogeneous modelling 
practices does not per se enable one to build more explanatory models than 
the models one can build by relying on discipline-specific modelling 
practices (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2017b, for a critical comparison of leading 
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economic and neuroeconomic models of choice). 
 
Second, SI contributions often yield to the imperializing and/or the targeted 
disciplines modelling and explanatory benefits which may compensate for 
the loss of cross-disciplinary diversity putatively involved in such 
contributions even under the assumption that cross-disciplinary diversity 
has high intrinsic value. By way of illustration, many authors complain that 
economists’ SI contributions invade the ‘traditional territory’ of other 
disciplines (see e.g. Fine, 2000, on sociology, and Lewin, 1996, on 
psychology) and export a “methodology that is in many cases [...] 
inappropriate” (Dupré, 2001, 128). However, those contributions have 
yielded valuable modelling and explanatory benefits not just to economists 
(see e.g. Lazear, 2000), but also to the practitioners of the targeted 
disciplines. To see this, consider economists’ recent applications of 
constrained optimization techniques to model the activation patterns of 
specific neural populations across several choice settings (see e.g. Ross, 
2008, on the neural substrates of intertemporal choices). These applications 
yielded significant modelling benefits to neuro-psychological modellers, 
enabling them to develop algorithmic models that predict choices even 
when standard economic models (e.g. expected utility theory) fail to do so 
(see e.g. Glimcher, 2011, ch.12-15). 
 
And third, on many indicators of cross-disciplinary diversity, not all SI 
contributions reduce or threaten cross-disciplinary diversity. In fact, several 
SI contributions seem to enhance (rather than reduce) such diversity both 
by opening novel research avenues and by generating new cross-
disciplinary fields. To illustrate this, consider the wide range of studies that 
from the 1960s onwards have attempted to systematically integrate 
evolutionary theory and game theoretic models to explain aspects of human 
behavior formerly investigated by other disciplines (see e.g. Rice and 
Smart, 2011, for a review). These SI contributions have enhanced cross-
disciplinary diversity not just by opening novel research avenues (see e.g. 
Alexander, 2014, on evolutionary game theoretic studies of the emergence 
of signaling systems and linguistic drift, and Bicchieri, 2006, on 
evolutionary game theoretic studies of the emergence of social norms of 
cooperation), but also by generating new cross-disciplinary fields (e.g. 
think of evolutionary game theory). 
 
 
4. Objection from the Disunity of Science 
 
 
The objection from the disunity of science (see e.g. Dupré, 1983, 1995 and 
2001) proceeds as follows. Scientific theorists and practitioners commonly 
aim to increase the variety of phenomena they can model and explain within 
their disciplines. Modelling and explanatory unifications are often regarded 
as major accomplishments both in general philosophy of science (see e.g. 
Kitcher, 1981, and Thagard, 1997) and in specific disciplines (see e.g. 
Bechtel and Hamilton, 2007, on biology, and Ferejohn and Satz, 1995, on 
economics). However, SI contributions frequently target disciplines that 
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sharply differ from the imperializing disciplines in terms of methods, 
evidential standards, and categorizations (see e.g. Roskies, 2010, on 
neuroscientists’ SI contributions targeting philosophical conceptions of 
free agency). These cross-disciplinary differences, in turn, significantly 
constrain the modelling and explanatory relevance of SI contributions for 
the targeted disciplines (see e.g. Dupré, 1995). Indeed - the objection goes 
- the history of science abounds with cases where the lack of unification 
between the imperializing and the targeted disciplines hampers the 
modelling and explanatory relevance of SI contributions between such 
disciplines (see e.g. Dupré, 2001, ch.6, for a critique of economists’ SI 
contributions targeting other decision sciences).6 
 
The objection from the disunity of science correctly notes that cross-
disciplinary differences may hamper the modelling and explanatory 
relevance of SI contributions between the involved disciplines. Even so, 
there are at least three reasons to doubt that this objection provides a cogent 
basis to oppose many instances of SI. First, it is often hard to integrate 
judgments of the extent to which specific disciplines differ in terms of 
methods, evidential standards, and categorizations into overall judgments 
of cross-disciplinary unification. To illustrate this, consider the ongoing 
debate as to whether or not economics and neuro-psychology have become 
more unified over the last few decades (see e.g. Bruni and Sugden, 2007, 
Hands, 2010, and Hausman, 1992). Disagreements about this issue stem not 
just from the fact that different authors use dissimilar criteria to demarcate 
the domain of economics and neuro-psychology, but also from profound 
divergences as to how judgments of the extent to which these disciplines 
differ in terms of methods, evidential standards, and categorizations should 
be integrated into overall judgments of cross-disciplinary unification (see 
e.g. Fumagalli, 2016b). Hence, such disagreements cannot be resolved 
simply by agreeing on particular criteria to demarcate the domain of the 
examined disciplines. 
 
Second, even assuming that judgments of the extent to which specific 
disciplines differ in terms of methods, evidential standards, and 
categorizations can be feasibly integrated into overall judgments of cross-
disciplinary unification, several SI contributions target disciplines whose 
methods, evidential standards, and categorizations resemble (rather than 
sharply differ from) those entrenched in the imperializing disciplines (see 
e.g. Churchland, 2007, on cognitive neuroscientists’ SI contributions that 
aim to replace cognitive psychologists’ functional models of specific 
cognitive capacities with neuroscience mechanistic models of the same 
capacities; see also Ross, 2008, on reductionist neuroeconomic models of 
choice which replicate the experimental protocols of the behavioral 
economics models they declaredly aim to supersede). Whenever this is the 
                                                          
6 Philosophers have proposed various indicators of cross-disciplinary unification, 
which encompass a range of ontological, axiological, and methodological 
elements of the involved disciplines (see e.g. Grantham, 2004, and Wylie, 1999). 
Here I focus on the unity of methods, evidential standards, and categorizations 
since most proponents of the objection from the disunity of science focus on these 
elements. 
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case, appealing to putative differences between the imperializing 
disciplines and the targeted disciplines does not provide a cogent basis to 
oppose SI contributions between such disciplines. 
 
And third, SI contributions frequently yield valuable modelling and 
explanatory benefits even in cases where the targeted disciplines sharply 
differ from the imperializing disciplines in terms of methods, evidential 
standards, and categorizations. To illustrate this, consider economists’ SI 
contributions that systematically apply constrained optimization techniques 
to model and explain phenomena investigated by several different 
disciplines (see e.g. Boudon, 2003, on sociology, Glimcher, 2011, on 
neuroscience, and Green and Shapiro, 1994, on political science). Some of 
these SI contributions merely represent (as opposed to explain) their target 
phenomena. Others, instead, yield insights that are plausibly regarded as 
explanatory under various entrenched accounts of explanation (see e.g. 
Ferejohn and Satz, 1995, and Fumagalli, 2017c, on the unificationist 
account; see also Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2015, and Ylikoski and 
Aydinonat, 2014, on the counterfactual account). That is to say, the mere 
fact that some SI contributions target disciplines whose methods, evidential 
standards, and categorizations sharply differ from those entrenched in the 
imperializing disciplines does not per se cast doubt on the modelling and 
explanatory relevance of such contributions. In particular, grounding 
cogent opposition to SI would require one to explicate how exactly the 
differences between the imperializing and the targeted disciplines hamper 
the modelling and explanatory relevance of SI contributions between such 
disciplines. Unfortunately, the critics of SI have hitherto failed to meet this 
justificatory requirement. 
 
To be sure, some proponents of the objection from the disunity of science 
attempt to identify correlations between variations in the distance between 
specific disciplines’ domains and variations in the modelling and 
explanatory relevance of SI contributions between such disciplines. More 
specifically, some defend the objection from the disunity of science by 
alleging that the modelling and explanatory relevance of SI contributions 
reliably decreases the further away these contributions are applied beyond 
the original domain of the imperializing disciplines (see e.g. Dupré, 2001, 
ch.1). The idea is that a discipline’s theories and methods become 
“increasingly partial in their relevance [the] further away [they are applied] 
from their central areas of application” (Dupré, 1995, 380). This defense 
points to a prima facie promising way to strengthen the objection from the 
disunity of science, but faces at least three unaddressed justificatory 
challenges. 
 
First, its proponents have yet to provide precise and defensible metrics to 
measure the distance between different disciplines’ domains (see e.g. Mäki, 
2013 and 2016). This lack of precise and defensible metrics, in turn, 
hampers the proffered attempts to ground opposition to SI on appeals to the 
putative distance between different disciplines’ domains. Second, even 
assuming that some precise and defensible metric to measure the distance 
between different disciplines’ domains was provided, it is dubious that the 
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modelling and explanatory relevance of SI contributions reliably decreases 
with putative increases in the distance between the domains of the 
disciplines involved in such contributions (see e.g. Kitcher, 1981, and 
Klein, 2010, on various cases of explanatory unification that encompass 
several different disciplines). 7  And third, even if the modelling and 
explanatory relevance of SI contributions reliably decreased with putative 
increases in the distance between the domains of the disciplines involved 
in such contributions, the application of a discipline’s theories and methods 
may still prompt (or be more likely to prompt than to hinder) significant 
modelling and explanatory advances across several different disciplines. In 
fact, as noted in this and the previous sections, the history of science 
abounds with cases where specific disciplines’ theories and methods have 
been successfully applied to model and explain phenomena investigated by 
several different disciplines. To put it differently, neither the objection from 
the disunity of science nor the proffered defenses of this objection provide 
a cogent basis to oppose many instances of SI. 
 
 
5. Objection from Counterfactual Scientific Progress 
 
 
The objection from counterfactual scientific progress opposes SI 
contributions insofar as they preclude the targeted disciplines from 
progressing in ways these disciplines would have progressed in the absence 
of such contributions (see e.g. Clarke and Walsh, 2009, 195 and 201, and 
2013, 342-4). Considerations of counterfactual scientific progress are 
frequently taken to bear on the justifiability of cross-disciplinary 
interactions (see e.g. Wray, 2002), and figure prominently in recent 
attempts to evaluate the justifiability of SI contributions (see e.g. Walsh and 
Boucher, 2017; see also Bowler, 2013, and Soler et al., 2015, for recent 
attempts to build on counterfactual history of science to elucidate how 
specific disciplines could have developed in the absence of particular 
events). Nonetheless, there are three major reasons to doubt that the 
objection from counterfactual scientific progress provides a cogent basis to 
oppose many instances of SI. 
 
First, whether or not SI contributions are plausibly taken to promote 
progress in the targeted disciplines may crucially depend on what account 
of scientific progress one adopts (see e.g. Hands, 1985a and 1985b, on 
different accounts of progress in economics). However, dissimilar accounts 
of scientific progress have been proposed (see e.g. Kuhn, 1970, Lakatos, 
1970, Laudan, 1977, and Popper, 1963, ch.10-11), and determining what 
account of scientific progress should be adopted to assess cross-disciplinary 
interactions is notoriously controversial (see e.g. Bird, 2007, and Cevolani 
and Tambolo, 2013, for recent discussions). This does not prevent the 
                                                          
7  Kitcher has more recently endorsed a more ‘modest’ unificationist view, 
according to which scientific theorists and practitioners should aim at “finding as 
much unity as [they] can” (1999, 339) while acknowledging that there are limits 
to the extent science can be unified. My reference to Kitcher’s earlier works (e.g. 
1981) does not commit me to endorse his later ‘modest’ unificationist view. 
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proponents of the objection from counterfactual scientific progress from 
identifying accounts of scientific progress that are sufficiently precise and 
plausible to ground evaluations of some SI contributions. Still, it severely 
constrains the informativeness of these evaluations whenever the accounts 
of scientific progress on which those evaluations rest involve controversial 
empirical or normative assumptions. This point holds not just for accounts 
of scientific progress that disagree on the possibility of providing rationally 
defensible criteria for assessing the progressiveness of disciplines’ 
theoretical developments (see e.g. Laudan, 1977, versus Kuhn, 1970), but 
also for accounts of scientific progress that aim to provide such criteria. 
 
To give one example, compare Popper’s and Lakatos’ accounts of scientific 
progress. Both of these accounts aim to provide rationally defensible 
criteria for assessing the progressiveness of disciplines’ theoretical 
developments (see e.g. Worrall, 2002), but can ground rather dissimilar 
evaluations regarding such developments. For instance, according to 
Popper a novel theory fosters scientific progress when it has “new and 
testable consequences” and successfully predicts previously unobserved 
phenomena (1963, 241-3). For his part, Lakatos defines a series of theories 
as progressive if it is “consistently theoretically progressive” - i.e. each 
successive theory predicts some previously unexpected fact - and at least 
“intermittently empirically progressive” - i.e. “every now and then [the 
theories’ predictions are] corroborated” (1970, 134). There are several 
respects in which Lakatos’ criteria for scientific progress are less 
demanding than the ones proposed by Popper. For example, Lakatos 
requires intermittent (rather than continuous) empirical progress. 
Moreover, while Popper holds that only previously unknown facts count 
when assessing theories’ progressiveness, Lakatos allows that a theory can 
be supported by previously known facts, provided that those facts were not 
employed in constructing the theory. These differences, in turn, can ground 
rather dissimilar evaluations regarding the alleged progressiveness of the 
theoretical developments prompted by SI contributions (see e.g. Hands, 
1985a and 1985b, on various theoretical developments prompted by 
economists’ SI contributions). 
 
Second, scientific theorists and practitioners are rarely in the epistemic 
position to establish that SI contributions preclude the targeted disciplines 
from progressing in ways these disciplines would have progressed in the 
absence of such contributions (see e.g. Chang, 2015, and Kusch, 2015, for 
contrasting evaluations of what impact counterfactual developments in 18-
19th century chemistry would have had on the subsequent study of energy). 
This problem stems not only from the difficulties inherent in providing a 
precise and uncontroversial account of scientific progress, but also from the 
limitations affecting scientists’ epistemic access to counterfactual 
disciplinary developments (see e.g. Kidd, 2013 and 2016a). By way of 
illustration, ascertaining whether a discipline’s SI contributions have 
detrimental (as opposed to beneficial) effects on the progress of another 
discipline requires one to estimate and assess the developmental trajectories 
of both disciplines in a number of actual and counterfactual scenarios. 
Unfortunately, several factors (e.g. the vast range of involved 
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counterfactual scenarios, the difficulty of reliably estimating these 
scenarios’ probability of occurrence) constrain scientists’ ability to make 
reliable estimates and assessments. To see this, consider recent attempts to 
evaluate what impact importing currently available neuro-psychological 
findings would have had on the development of 20th century economic 
theory (see e.g. Camerer et al., 2005). The limitations affecting scientists’ 
epistemic access to counterfactual developments in economic theory 
significantly constrain the informativeness of these evaluations. In 
particular, it is difficult to see on what basis one is to ascertain how 
economic theory would have evolved, had it been informed by currently 
available neuro-psychological findings. In fact, the range of possibilities is 
so wide that favouring one particular counterfactual scenario would be 
quite arbitrary (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2016a, for a discussion of some such 
scenarios). 
 
And third, on most accounts of scientific progress, imperializing disciplines 
often make considerable progress thanks to their imperialistic 
contributions to other disciplines. This progress, in turn, may vindicate the 
associated SI contributions even if they preclude the targeted disciplines 
from progressing in ways these disciplines would have progressed in the 
absence of such contributions. To illustrate this, consider recent attempts to 
replace cognitive psychologists’ functional models of specific cognitive 
capacities with neuroscience mechanistic models of the same capacities 
(see e.g. Churchland, 2007, on individuals’ processing of sensory 
experiences). According to some authors, these SI contributions have 
precluded cognitive psychology from progressing in ways it would have 
progressed in the absence of those contributions (see e.g. McCauley, 2007). 
Yet, on most accounts of scientific progress, such contributions have 
prompted considerable progress in cognitive neuroscientists’ modelling of 
cognitive capacities (see e.g. Piccinini and Craver, 2011, on the predictive 
and explanatory benefits yielded by neuro-psychological models that 
systematically integrate functional and mechanistic insights about such 
capacities). More generally, there seems to be no general reason to think 
that SI contributions prevalently (or more likely) hamper - as opposed to 
promote - progress in the disciplines they target. Indeed, as noted in Section 
3, SI contributions often prompt significant modelling and explanatory 
advances in the targeted disciplines. Whenever this is the case, 
considerations of counterfactual scientific progress do not ground cogent 
opposition to SI, and may actually support SI contributions unless one is 
able to demonstrate that the targeted disciplines would have made even 
more progress in the absence of such contributions. 
 
Faced with these observations, a critic of SI may acknowledge that some SI 
contributions prompt significant progress in the disciplines they target. At 
the same time, she may draw on progress-related axiological considerations 
to object that SI should be resisted when it hampers or prevents the 
expression of important moral and social values in the targeted disciplines 
(see e.g. Clarke and Walsh, 2009, 195 and 204, and 2013, 342 and 348). 
Considerations of moral and social values frequently figure in assessments 
of cross-disciplinary interactions (see e.g. Elliott and McKaughan, 2014, 
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Kitcher, 2011, and Parker, 2014). Even so, appealing to moral and social 
values does not ground wide-ranging opposition to SI, and may actually 
support SI contributions. To see this, consider a recent proposal to regard 
SI as morally wrong “when it gives rise to [unfair] distribution of 
credibility”, i.e. when it leads to a specific kind of epistemic injustice 
consisting in “a mismatch between credibility and expertise in a particular 
domain” (Rolin, 2017, 1; see also Fricker, 2007, and Kidd et al., 2017, on 
distinct kinds of epistemic injustice and their interrelations). This proposal 
aptly emphasizes the implications that considerations of epistemic justice 
may have for the justifiability of some SI contributions. Still, the proffered 
attempts to ground opposition to SI on considerations of epistemic justice 
invite three interrelated rejoinders. 
 
First, many criteria have been proposed to assess whether cross-
disciplinary interactions lead to unfair distribution of credibility (see e.g. 
Kusch, 2015, on social indicators of reliability and institutional status), and 
there may be widespread reasonable disagreement as to how SI 
contributions fare in terms of distinct criteria (see e.g. Davis, 2017, on 
various debates about the justifiability of economists’ SI contributions). 
Second, it remains unclear which groups of scientists (e.g. practitioners of 
the imperializing disciplines, practitioners of the targeted disciplines, 
putatively independent experts, etc.) are best equipped to judge whether SI 
contributions lead to unfair distribution of credibility, and by means of what 
evaluative criteria one is supposed to adjudicate conflicting judgments 
about this issue. And third, there seems to be no general reason to think that 
SI contributions prevalently (or more likely) exacerbate - as opposed to 
remedy - previous epistemic injustice. In fact, on many criteria for assessing 
epistemic justice, SI contributions frequently appear to remedy (rather than 
exacerbate) previous epistemic injustice. By way of illustration, consider 
again the evolutionary branches generated by evolutionary SI contributions 
across distinct social and behavioral sciences (see Section 3). These SI 
contributions challenged a wide range of less predictive and explanatory 
theories that were formerly entrenched in the targeted disciplines, thereby 
contributing to realign those theories’ credibility with their actual epistemic 
performance (see e.g. Downes, 2017, on evolutionary biology’s influence 
on various theories in biology; see also Downes, 2015, on evolutionary 
biologists’ criticisms of prominent works in evolutionary psychology). That 
is to say, considerations of epistemic justice may bear on the justifiability 
of some SI contributions, but do not ground wide-ranging opposition to SI, 
and may often be taken to support SI contributions. 
 
 
6. Objection from Cumulative Constraints 
 
 
The objection from cumulative constraints subordinates the justifiability of 
SI contributions to the satisfaction of a series of cumulative evaluative 
constraints, namely the ontological, axiological, institutional and 
epistemological constraints (see e.g. Mäki, 2009 and 2013). The idea is that 
SI contributions are justifiable if they satisfy all these four constraints, and 
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are instead to be resisted or opposed if they fail to satisfy one or more of 
those constraints (see e.g. Mäki, 2009, 373, and 2013, 336). In this section, 
I assess each of the aforementioned four constraints in turn. I shall argue 
that those constraints improve on former attempts to evaluate various 
instances of SI, but are articulated at an exceedingly high level of 
abstraction to ground cogent opposition to SI and identify what features 
allegedly make SI unjustified. This does not preclude the proponents of 
these constraints from refining the formulation of those constraints so as to 
license informative verdicts regarding specific instances of SI. Still, as I 
argue below, the proposed refinements of such constraints face non-trivial 
challenges. As a result, the proponents of the objection from cumulative 
constraints should either develop further refinements of the proposed 
constraints or modify the justificatory requirements associated with such 
constraints (e.g. allow that some SI contributions may be justified even if 
they fail to satisfy some constraints, limit the intended scope of the 
proposed constraints to specific sets of SI contributions, etc.).8 
 
The ontological constraint subordinates the justifiability of SI contributions 
to their ability to foster so-called ontological - as opposed to mere 
derivational - unification. The idea is that these contributions should 
“successfully represent how things are related in the causal structure of the 
world”, rather than merely derive “large classes of explanandum sentences 
from a parsimonious set of theoretical sentences” (Mäki, 2009, 363-4). The 
following two interpretations of the ontological constraint have been 
proposed (Kuorikoski and Lehtinen, 2010, 349-350). On the one hand, the 
structural interpretation holds that the ontological constraint is met 
whenever the phenomena investigated by the imperializing and the targeted 
disciplines exhibit similar structural characteristics (e.g. equilibria with 
equivalent mathematical descriptions). On the other hand, the causal 
interpretation holds that the ontological constraint is met only when the 
phenomena investigated by the imperializing and the targeted disciplines 
share a common causal basis (e.g. think of the micro-physical substrates of 
the behavioral patterns studied by distinct decision sciences). Neither of 
these interpretations seems to provide an informative basis for assessing the 
justifiability of SI contributions. More specifically, the structural 
interpretation targets properties that are instantiated by too many and overly 
diverse systems to be plausibly regarded as an informative evaluative 
criterion (see e.g. Kuorikoski and Lehtinen, 2010, on the vast variety of 
                                                          
8  I am not concerned here with discussing which of these two argumentative 
strategies should be pursued by the proponents of the objection from cumulative 
constraints. For my evaluative purposes, I just note that my appraisal of Mäki’s 
constraints differs from other appraisals (see e.g. Davis, 2012), which hold that 
since these constraints are unlikely to be satisfied, endorsing such constraints 
supports an exceedingly conservative position regarding the justifiability of SI 
contributions. To be sure, one might agree that a literal interpretation of Mäki’s 
constraints could yield implausibly restrictive verdicts about the justifiability of 
SI contributions. This, however, does not exclude that a more nuanced reading of 
those constraints may avoid this pitfall. In particular, it does not imply that Mäki’s 
strategy of evaluating SI contributions by specifying constraints on cross-
disciplinary interactions is “itself […] problematic” (Davis, 2012, 216). 
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systems that exhibit equilibria with equivalent mathematical descriptions). 
Conversely, the causal interpretation seemingly overlooks that SI 
contributions may be justified even when the phenomena investigated by 
the imperializing and the targeted disciplines lack a common causal basis. 
To see this, consider again the explanatory insights yielded by economists’ 
SI contributions that systematically apply constrained optimization 
techniques to model and explain phenomena investigated by several 
different disciplines (see Section 4). The mere fact that constrained 
optimization techniques can be used to model phenomena investigated by 
other disciplines falls short of implying that these techniques provide causal 
explanations of such phenomena (see e.g. Ylikoski, 2013). Even so, those 
techniques enabled economists to provide insights that are plausibly 
regarded as explanatory under various entrenched accounts of explanation 
(see e.g. Ferejohn and Satz, 1995, and Fumagalli, 2017c, on the 
unificationist account; see also Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2015, and 
Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014, on the counterfactual account). These 
explanatory benefits, in turn, bear in favour of a range of economists’ SI 
contributions (see Section 4), thereby casting doubt on the causal 
interpretation’s implication that SI contributions may be justified only 
when the phenomena investigated by the imperializing and the targeted 
disciplines share a common causal basis.9 
 
The axiological constraint states that due to variations in the epistemic, 
moral and social significance of the facts explained, a theory that explains 
a higher number and variety of facts “is not always a better theory” (Mäki, 
2009, 369). The thought is that “theories that unify insignificant phenomena 
[by] ignoring or marginalizing significant ones are much less supportable 
than those that unify significant phenomena at the expense of less 
significant ones” (Mäki, 2013, 337). This constraint provides a basis to 
integrate considerations of epistemic, moral and social values into the 
assessment of SI contributions. Nonetheless, as it stands, such constraint 
does not offer detailed guidance on how to weigh and trade-off epistemic, 
moral and social values in assessing SI contributions. This lack of guidance 
is problematic, since many such values influence the justifiability of SI 
contributions (see e.g. Steel, 2010, on cases where non-epistemic values 
override epistemic considerations in determining whether SI contributions 
are justifiable) and often have conflicting influences on the justifiability of 
SI (see e.g. Elliott and McKaughan, 2014, on the trade-offs between 
epistemic and non-epistemic values involved in choosing between distinct 
risk assessment procedures in various policy contexts; see also Hertwig and 
Ortmann, 2008, on how ethical and methodological bans on lying to 
                                                          
9  The causal and structural interpretations do not exhaust the set of possible 
interpretations of the ontological constraint, so my critical evaluation of these two 
proposed interpretations does not exclude that one may provide precise and 
plausible interpretations of this constraint. Even so, my critical evaluation 
challenges the proponents of such constraint to provide more precise and plausible 
interpretations. In the absence of such interpretations, my critical evaluation can 
be provisionally taken to cast doubt on the informativeness of the ontological 
constraint. 
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experimental subjects constrain what insights SI contributions can yield in 
experimental studies with human subjects). 
 
The institutional constraint proscribes against SI contributions exhibiting 
“dismissive hegemonic arrogance” towards the targeted disciplines and 
against “intellectual monopolies protected by non-argumentative means of 
exclusion” (Mäki, 2013, 337). This constraint nicely fits several authors’ 
emphasis on the epistemic and pragmatic benefits of cross-disciplinary 
collaboration (see e.g. Longino, 2002, Rolin, 2015, and Wray, 2002). At the 
same time, attempts to ground opposition to SI on such constraint invite 
three main rejoinders. First, the formulation of the constraint crucially relies 
on generic metaphorical expressions (e.g. ‘dismissive hegemonic 
arrogance’), which hinders the constraint’s ability to license informative 
verdicts regarding the justifiability of many SI contributions (see e.g. Kidd, 
2016b, for similar remarks about the practice of epistemic vice-charging).10 
Second, on most commonsense interpretations of ‘dismissive hegemonic 
arrogance’, only a relatively narrow subset of SI contributions appear to 
exhibit dismissive hegemonic arrogance towards the disciplines they target. 
By way of illustration, consider again economists’ SI contributions to other 
behavioral and social sciences. Some proponents of these SI contributions 
exhibit what many regard as dismissive hegemonic arrogance towards the 
targeted disciplines (see e.g. Becker, 1976, for the claim that economic 
theory can be used to explain ‘all human behavior’). Others, instead, do not 
exhibit this attitude, and cautiously guard other economists against 
claiming “more than [they] can deliver” (Binmore, 1999, F17). And third, 
the issue whether SI contributions exhibit dismissive hegemonic arrogance 
towards the targeted disciplines seems to have only indirect and limited 
relevance for the justifiability of such contributions. In particular, one may 
agree that dismissive hegemonic arrogance is a normatively objectionable 
attitude, and yet maintain that many SI contributions are justifiable 
irrespective of whether their proponents exhibit such attitude. This does not 
exclude that violations of the institutional constraint may bear on the 
justifiability of some SI contributions (see e.g. Kidd, 2017, and Mäki and 
Marchionni, 2010, on cases where positions of academic hegemonic 
dominance confer to the dominant disciplines competitive advantages that 
do not reflect their actual epistemic performance). Still, it makes it 
questionable whether the institutional constraint licenses informative 
verdicts regarding the justifiability of many SI contributions.11 
                                                          
10  To give one example, consider Mäki’s claim that “within an appropriate 
institutional framework there is little reason to worry about imperialistic 
trespassing” (2013, 337). This claim seems prima facie plausible, yet specifies 
neither what an ‘appropriate’ institutional framework consists in nor by means of 
what criteria one is supposed to establish whether any given institutional 
framework is ‘appropriate’ in the to-be-specified sense. As a result, different 
authors may nominally endorse such claim and yet radically disagree as to what 
SI contributions are justifiable and what criteria one should employ to assess the 
justifiability of SI contributions. 
11 This informativeness concern exacerbates when one examines the proffered 
attempts to apply the institutional constraint in concrete situations. By way of 
illustration, consider Mäki and Marchionni’s claim that “too much homogeneity 
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Finally, the epistemological constraint “advises against dogmatic 
commitment and recommends a strong sense of fallibility and openness to 
critical conversation across disciplinary boundaries” (Mäki, 2009, 373). 
The idea is that since it is difficult to determine whether SI contributions 
meet the other three constraints, one should subject the background 
assumptions of SI contributions (e.g. what constitutes an adequate 
explanation of the examined phenomena, whether the employed modelling 
techniques yield reliable insights concerning these phenomena) to criticism 
and revision even if she believes that these contributions meet such 
constraints (see e.g. Mäki, 2009, 370-2, and 2013, 336-7). I view with 
favour the anti-dogmatic commitment recommended by the 
epistemological constraint. However, I think that attempts to ground 
opposition to SI on this constraint face at least two major challenges. First, 
the formulation of the constraint crucially relies on generic metaphorical 
expressions (e.g. ‘strong sense of fallibility’, ‘openness to critical 
conversation’), which hinders the constraint’s ability to license informative 
verdicts regarding the justifiability of many SI contributions. And second, 
the following dilemma hampers attempts to specify what sets of 
background assumptions should be subject to criticism and revision for SI 
contributions to be justifiable. 
 
On the one hand, simply claiming that one should subject some of the 
background assumptions of SI contributions to criticism and revision is 
overly vague to license informative verdicts regarding the justifiability of 
many SI contributions. On the other hand, claiming that one should subject 
all (or even most of) the background assumptions of SI contributions to 
criticism and revision imposes overly stringent requirements on the 
justifiability of SI contributions. For in primis, scientific theorists and 
practitioners frequently lack a shared cross-disciplinary framework to 
subject all (or even most of) the background assumptions of their SI 
contributions to criticism and revision (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2016b, on how 
the lack of a shared explanatory framework across economics, psychology 
and neuroscience impedes the evaluation of some neuroeconomists’ SI 
contributions to economic modelling). And second, significant modelling 
and explanatory advances have been prompted by SI contributions that did 
not subject all (or even most of) their background assumptions to criticism 
and revision. To give one example, social epistemologists have made 
significant advances in systematically extending rational choice models to 
explain scientists’ division of cognitive labor (see e.g. Muldoon and 
Weisberg, 2011, Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009, and Zollman, 2007). Yet, 
                                                          
and closed dogmatism […] would discourage the creation and pursuit of […] 
possibly fruitful lines of inquiry [whereas] too much heterogeneity and criticism 
would also be inadvisable” (2010, 12). This claim seems prima facie plausible, yet 
clarifies neither what ‘too much’ homogeneity and heterogeneity consist in nor by 
means of what criteria one is supposed to establish whether the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity found in specific cross-disciplinary contexts is ‘too much’. As a 
result, different authors may nominally endorse such claim and yet radically 
disagree as to what SI contributions are justifiable and what criteria one should 
employ to assess the justifiability of SI contributions. 
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these SI contributions do not subject all their background assumptions to 
criticism and revision, and it is hard to see why this fact alone would make 
those SI contributions unjustified.12 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
Over the last few decades, several objections have been put forward to 
ground opposition to SI and identify what features allegedly make SI 
unjustified. In this paper, I argued that these objections provide a valuable 
basis for opposing some instances of SI, but do not yield cogent reasons to 
think that SI in general is objectionable or unjustified. If correct, this result 
supports at least three wide-ranging implications for the ongoing 
philosophical debate about the justifiability of SI. First, the critics of SI 
should provide more informative criteria for assessing SI and ground their 
opposition to SI on more plausible empirical and normative 
presuppositions. Second, what (if anything) makes some SI contributions 
objectionable does not lie in their imperialistic character, but rather relates 
to putative flaws in their empirical or normative presuppositions and to the 
unwarranted social or pragmatic implications some derive from such 
contributions. And third, the justifiability of SI contributions is best judged 
on the basis of specific case studies rather than general evaluative criteria 
that abstract away from the modelling and explanatory practices of the 
examined disciplines. These three implications do not exclude that one may 
gain informative insights by assessing specific sets of SI contributions qua 
imperialistic contributions. Still, they should make scientific theorists and 
practitioners wary of general calls either in favour of or against SI 
contributions. In particular, they challenge all those who debate about SI to 
further refine the criteria proposed for evaluating the justifiability of SI and 
focus their evaluations on specific subsets of SI contributions. 
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12 The fact that social epistemologists’ SI contributions do not subject all their 
background assumptions to criticism and revision has led some to criticize these 
SI contributions for relying on questionable background assumptions (see e.g. 
Alexander et al., 2015). Still, most of the critics concur that the justifiability of 
those SI contributions depends not so much on whether their proponents subject 
all their background assumptions to criticism and revision, but rather on the actual 
empirical and normative plausibility of such assumptions. 
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